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Abstract 
The treatment by the United Kingdom of Union citizens remaining on its territory after Brexit 
and conversely that of UK nationals by EU27 Member States on theirs has given rise to 
much discussion and analysis. By contrast, there has been comparatively little systematic 
and detailed exploration of the question of the impact of Brexit on the exercise of Union 
citizens’ rights against their  own Member State. It is an issue which is for the most part 
ignored in the current Withdrawal Agreement. The purpose of this article is to show that this 
blind spot opens up a potential gap in legal protection of the rights of Union citizens, which is 
likely to remain regardless of the outcome of the Brexit negotiations and whether a 
withdrawal agreement is concluded or not. The paper discusses the extent to which the 
adversarial nature of the withdrawal process has contributed to this failure to address this 
issue and the ways in which courts could step in to provide the legal protection that political 
processes were unable to deliver. 
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 1. Introduction 
The consequences of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union on the 
rights of Union citizens is clearly an important aspect of the Brexit process. Indeed, right 
from the start, safeguarding those rights was identified in the first set of European council 
Guidelines for Brexit negotiations as the “first priority” for these negotiations. “Effective, 
enforceable, non-discriminatory and comprehensive” guarantees were to be provided to 
enable Union citizens to “exercise their rights through smooth and simple administrative 
procedures”.1  
It also seems to have been on the whole a somewhat easier and less controversial aspect of 
the Brexit negotiations. While discussions on the other two main topics addressed in the 
initial phase of the process, namely settlement of the UK’s financial obligations and 
avoidance of a physical border on the island of Ireland were protracted, there was a greater 
element of consensus between the negotiators on how to address the question of citizens’ 
rights after Brexit, notwithstanding the persistence of some divergent perspectives on 
specific aspects right up to November 2018, when agreement was reached on a Withdrawal 
Agreement.2 
While negotiations were re-opened in Autumn 2019 following the coming into office of a new 
UK government in the summer, the revised text of the Withdrawal Agreement agreed in 
November 20193 has not amended Part Two of the Agreement,4 in which the provisions 
devoted to citizens’ rights are contained. Both sides of the negotiations would seem 
therefore to regard the consensus previously achieved on citizens’ rights as acceptable. 
Yet the Withdrawal Agreement would potentially leave a significant gap in the protection of 
citizens’ rights after Brexit. Union citizenship endows citizens and their families with rights 
not only vis-à-vis other Member States but also with respect to their own Member State. 
While not perfect, the Withdrawal Agreement has much to say about the former. In relation 
to the latter, however, the Agreement is largely silent. The adversarial nature of the Article 
50 TEU process has tended to obscure this dimension of Union citizenship. The focus has 
been on the UK protecting the rights of their nationals residing in the EU27 Member States 
and on EU institutions protecting the rights of EU27 citizens residing in the UK without much 
consideration being given as to how the rights of individuals vis-à-vis public authorities within 
their own camp, so to speak, would be affected. 
The Withdrawal Agreement has not yet been ratified and it is still unclear at time of writing5 
whether it will be and, if so, when.6 Whatever happens on this front is unlikely to make much 
 
1 European Council (Art. 50) guidelines for Brexit negotiations, Brussels, 29 April 2017, para 8. 
2 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, [2019] OJ C66I/1. 
3 [2019] OJ C384I/1. 
4 Articles 9 to 39. 
5 November 2019. 
6 The main difficulty is the lack of clarity of the position of the British Parliament, particularly with the 
perspective of a general election in December 2019. It should be noted that ratification on the EU side 
will require the consent of the European Parliament. While it cannot be entirely ruled out that 
difference to the present enquiry. If a withdrawal agreement — whether the current one or a 
yet further revised one — is eventually ratified by both sides, it would in all likelihood contain 
identical or very similar provisions on citizens’ rights to those in the currently agreed text. A 
fortiori, if the UK were to leave the EU without a withdrawal agreement, citizens’ rights would 
be even less protected. 
This article aims to assess the extent of the gap in the protection of citizens’ rights after 
Brexit resulting from the failure to sufficiently consider the implications of Brexit of the 
relationship between nationals and their own Member States. It is structured as follows. In 
the first place, the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement will be analysed to highlight the 
existence of a blind spot in the Agreement on citizens’ rights towards their own Member 
State (section 2). Secondly, the extent to which courts may be able to counteract this 
potential gap in the legal protection of citizens’ rights, whether or not a withdrawal agreement 
is concluded, will be probed (section 3). Finally, how far the structure of the Article 50 
process itself contributes to the problem will be discussed (section 4). 
 
2. The citizens’ rights blind spot in the Withdrawal Agreement  
The Court of Justice has consistently held that Union law on the rights of citizens does not 
apply to situations which are wholly internal to a Member State and have no factors 
connecting them to any of the situations envisaged by Union law.7 A consequence of this is 
that Union citizens can sometimes find themselves unable to claim the benefit of certain 
rights towards their own Member States which are available to Union citizens who are 
nationals of other Member States, a situation commonly referred to as ‘reverse 
discrimination.’8 
It does not follow from this, however, that Union law has no application with respect to rights 
of Union citizens and their family vis-à-vis their own Member State. On the contrary, law 
reports abound with examples of individuals successfully invoking their status as Union 
citizen to claim some entitlement against the Member State of which they are a national 
either for their own benefit or for that of members of their family.  
By contrast, the citizens’ rights provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement are clearly focused 
on the rights of EU27 nationals against the UK and conversely those of UK nationals against 
the EU27 Member State in which they would keep residing after Brexit. This is clear both in 
terms of the personal scope of those provisions as in terms of the substantive rights they 
protect. From both perspectives, the negotiators seem to have been blind to, or deliberately 
set aside, the question of the rights of citizens towards their own Member State.  
 
Parliament may, at the last minute, threaten to withhold its consent subject to additional concessions 
on citizens’ rights, there are no signs at present that it intends to do so. 
7 Case 175/78 Saunders EU:C:1979:88, para 11. 
8 See, for instance, case C-434/09 McCarthy EU:C:2011:277. There is an abundant literature on 
reverse discrimination. See, inter alia, A Tryfonidou, 'Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal 
Situations: An Incongruity in a Citizens’ Europe' 35 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2008), 
p. 43. 
A. Personal scope 
Under Article 10 of the Withdrawal Agreement, the provisions on citizens’ rights are to apply 
to Union citizens who have exercised their Union law right to reside in the United Kingdom 
and conversely UK nationals who have exercised their Union law right to reside in an EU27 
Member State9 up to the end of the transition period contemplated in Article 126 of the 
Withdrawal Agreement.10 Those provisions also apply to family members and to frontier 
workers and their family members. Who is regarded as a family member capable of invoking 
the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement is not perfectly aligned11 with the notion of family 
member in Directive 2004/38 on the free movement rights of Union citizens and their families 
(the Citizens’ Rights Directive) 12 and family reunification will be more difficult in some 
circumstances where the family is not yet fully constituted and/or residing in the host State 
by the end of the transition period. In the vast majority of cases, however, the rights that 
family members would have enjoyed in the host State under Directive 2004/38 are grand-
fathered by the Withdrawal Agreement.13 
Setting aside the specific provisions on social security coordination discussed below, two 
aspects of the personal scope of the citizens’ rights provisions constitute a severe limitation 
on the possibility to invoke the benefits of the Agreement against one’s own Member State: 
the requirement of continuous residence and the impossibility for individuals who have not 
exercised, or ceased to exercise, free movement of rights to invoke the agreement. 
1. Continuity of residence requirement 
While the grand-fathering of residence rights in the Withdrawal Agreement is in principle a 
life-long one,14 it is nonetheless subject to the condition that the individuals concerned 
 
9 These provisions also apply to EU27 nationals who are frontier workers in the UK and vice versa, 
that is to EU27 nationals who exercise an economic activity as workers under Article 45 TFEU of as 
self-employed persons under Article 49 TFEU without residing there and vice versa. 
10 The transition period is, according to Article 126 of the Withdrawal Agreement, to run until 31 
December 2020. Article 132 foresees the possibility of that period being extended for up to two years. 
11 The main differences are: (i) more restrictive conditions apply to family members (including as of yet 
unborn children) who were not residing in the host Member State at the end of the transition period 
and seek to join the Union citizen afterwards; (ii) persons who belong to the wider circle of family 
members as defined in Article 3(2) of the Citizens’ Rights Directive are generally included only if their 
entry was already ‘facilitated’ by the host Member State or the person concerned had at least applied 
for such facilitation by the end of the transition period. In the latter case, there is no automatic right of 
entry and residence but a right to ‘facilitation’ of entry modelled on the terms of Article 3(2) of the 
Citizens’ Rights Directive. This also applies to unmarried partners where a ‘duly attested’ ‘durable 
relationship’ existed at the end of the transition period but no application for facilitation of entry had 
yet been done by that stage. 
12 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/ EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC, [2004] OJ L158/77. 
13 One category of Union citizens whose rights are unclear under the Withdrawal Agreement, 
however, are individuals who have a permanent right of residence in the host State but are 
temporarily no longer resident in that state. It is possible to read Article 10 as requiring residence in 
the host State at the end of the transition period as a condition for a Union citizen to invoke the benefit 
of the Agreement. While this seems contrary to the spirit of the Agreement and an unintended 
outcome, clearer wording would plainly be preferable. 
14 See Article 39. 
continue to reside in the host State.15 If an EU27 national decides to leave the UK or a UK 
national decides to leave the EU27 Member State in which they reside, the Withdrawal 
Agreement will cease to apply to them.16 
The problem with this is that returning home is a critical point in terms of being able to invoke 
union citizenship rights against one’s own Member State. It is at this point that, for instance, 
a Union citizen is particularly likely to need to invoke a right of residence for their family 
members in the home State under the Surinder Singh17 jurisprudence or seek recognition by 
the home State of a qualification acquired in the host Member State, as in the Kraus18 case. 
Yet, according to Article 10 of the Withdrawal Agreement, since they no longer at this point 
“continue to reside” in the host State, the citizens’ rights provisions cease to be applicable to 
them. 
Admittedly, in case of temporary visit to the home State, or elsewhere for that matter, the 
inapplicability of the citizens’ rights provisions is not immediate. The provisions of the 
Citizens’ Rights Directive on continuity of residence for the purpose of acquisition of 
permanent residence under the Directive are transposed to the question of continuity of 
residence for the purpose of applicability of the citizens’ rights provisions in the Withdrawal 
Agreement.19 An individual will therefore be able to leave the host State for up to six months 
per year or once for up to 12 months in case of an “important reason”20 without jeopardising 
the continued application of those provisions. In addition, if the individual has acquired a 
right of permanent residence in the host State, it would take an absence of five consecutive 
years from the host State for that permanent right of residence to be lost.21 Nonetheless, in 
case of definitive, or at least prolonged, return, the individual will eventually fall out of the 
scope of the Withdrawal Agreement. 
2. Non-applicability to non-movers and early returnees 
The wording of Article 10 would also imply that individuals who have never left their home 
State or who have returned to their home State before the end of the transition period fall 
outside the scope of the Withdrawal Agreement.22  
In relation to the latter, it could mean, for instance, that a professional recently returning to 
the UK from a EU27 home State, or vice-versa, might conceivably lose after the end of the 
transition period the right they would have had under Directive 2005/3623 to recognition in 
their home State of a professional qualification acquired in the host State and therefore the 
 
15 See Articles 10 and 11. 
16 As regards UK nationals, this would include the situation where the UK national moves from one 
EU27 Member State to another, as the grandfathering of rights applies only in the specific EU27 
Member State in which the UK national is a resident at the end of the transition period and would not 
allow for free movement between EU27 Member States. 
17 C-370/90 Surinder Singh EU:C:1992:296. 
18 C-19/92 Kraus EU:C:1993:125 
19 See Articles 11 and 15(2). 
20 The important reasons contemplated in Article 16(2) of Directive 2004/38 are reasons “such as 
pregnancy and childbirth, serious illness, study or vocational training, or a posting in another Member 
State or a third country.” 
21 See Article 15(3). 
22 There is an exception with respect to social security coordination, which will be discussed below. 
23 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the 
recognition of professional qualifications, [2005] OJ L255/22. 
right to exercise their chosen occupation. It would also mean that the protection of the right 
of residence in the home State afforded by the Surinder Singh caselaw to family members of 
a Union national returning home24 could come at an end once the transition period is over.  
The non-applicability of the agreement to individuals who have never exercised rights to free 
movement between the UK and an EU27 Member State is more understandable. In the 
absence of any exercise of free movement rights, the situation will as a rule be regarded as 
a wholly internal situation falling outside the scope of EU law on citizens’ rights.25 There is 
however an exception to this under the Ruiz Zambrano26 caselaw , in which the Court found 
that a third country national may have a right of residence in a Member State under Union 
law where refusing such a right of residence would result in a Union citizen who is 
dependent on that third country national being forced to leave the territory of the European 
Union as a whole and therefore deprived of the “genuine enjoyment of the substance of the 
rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen”.27 
Rights of residence under the Zambrano caselaw are normally exercised in the State of 
which the dependent Union citizen is a national.28 Brexit would not in itself affect the rights of 
Zambrano carers of EU27 nationals. It would, for instance, still be possible for the Colombian 
carers of Belgian children to rely on the Zambrano caselaw to establish a right of residence 
in Belgium so as to ensure that their children are not deprived of the “genuine enjoyment of 
the substance of the rights” attaching to their status as Union citizens. This, however, would 
no longer be true of the Zambrano carers of UK nationals since those UK nationals would no 
longer be Union citizens and therefore unable to invoke the need to protect the “genuine 
enjoyment” of their rights as Union citizens. Leaving the issue of Zambrano carers of UK 
nationals to be determined in accordance with domestic UK law opens up a gap in the legal 
protection provided by the Agreement even though it remains open to national law to provide 
the protection that the Agreement does not offer.29 
B. Rights protected in the Withdrawal Agreement 
Even if individuals were able to bring themselves within the personal scope of the 
Withdrawal Agreement, there remains the question of what rights they would be able to 
invoke. 
Citizens’ rights protected by the Withdrawal Agreement are enumerated in Title II of Part 
Two of the Agreement.30 Title II is divided into three chapters devoted respectively to rights 
of residence, to rights of workers and self-employed persons and to professional 
qualifications. Title III is not expressed in terms of rights but its contents, social security 
coordination, nonetheless establishes important entitlements for individuals after Brexit. This 
section will loosely follow the structure used in the Withdrawal Agreement by distinguishing 
 
24 See the paragraphs on the right of entry and residence below. 
25 See above n7. 
26 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano EU:C:2011:124. 
27 Ibid., para. 42-44. 
28 See Case C-86/12 Alopka EU:C:2013:645, paras 32-35. 
29 As it has in fact done. See below, n97. 
30 This title is curiously entitled “Rights and obligations” even though the only obligations it contains 
seem to be conditions to be fulfilled to be able to invoke the rights rather than self-standing 
obligations. 
between migration rights, rights related to the exercise of an economic activity and rights 
related to social assistance and social security. 
1. Migration rights 
By migration rights, I mean rights to free movement strict sensu, that is to say the right to 
cross a border, whether to leave or enter the territory of a Member State as well as right to 
stay within a Member State after having crossed the border, viz rights of residence. 
 Right of exit 
Article 4 of the Citizens’ Rights Directive expressly recognises the right to leave a Member 
State, including the Member of which one is a national, to travel to the territory of another 
Member State. In so doing, Article 4 echoes the recognition of the right to leave a country, 
including one’s own, found in multiple human rights instruments.31 
By contrast, the right of exit stipulated in Article 14 of the Withdrawal Agreement is 
exclusively a right of exit from the host State. While restrictions on the entry of nationals of 
other Member States are relatively commonplace, restrictions on exit, whether of one’s own 
nationals or other nationals, are less common. There are, however, a handful of cases 
decided by the Court of Justice concerning exit bans imposed by a Member States on its 
nationals and ostensibly motivated by public policy considerations.32  
The exclusion of exit controls from the host State in the Withdrawal Agreement would imply 
that if, for instance, UK nationals residing in an EU27 Member State were on a short visit to 
the UK, UK authorities could restrict the return of those UK nationals to their EU27 Member 
State of residence without any possibility to invoke provisions in the Withdrawal Agreement 
to challenge the restriction on exit. 
That said, such exit restrictions would normally be motivated on public policy grounds and, 
under Article 20 of the Withdrawal Agreement, the use of a public policy or public security 
derogation in relation to conduct occurring after the end of the transition period will be 
determined on the basis of national law only and will no longer be subject to control under 
Chapter VI of the Citizens’ Rights Directive. Whether the right of exit from the Home State 
were to fall within the scope of the Agreement or not would therefore not make much 
difference since the Withdrawal Agreement would leave the UK or the EU27 Member State 
concerned in any event largely unconstrained with respect to restrictions to cross-border 
movements between the UK and the EU based on public policy or public security.  
 Right of entry and residence 
As is the case with the right of exit, Articles 13 and 14 of the Withdrawal Agreement only 
provide for a right of residence in the host State, not in the home State. 
The non-recognition in the Withdrawal Agreement of a right of entry and residence in the 
home State is less of an issue for the State’s own nationals, given the international law 
 
31 See, for instance, Article 13.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or Article 2.2 of 
Protocol No. 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
32 See cases case C-33/07 Jipa EU:C:2008:396; C-430/10 Gaydarov EU:C:2011:749; C-434/10 
Aladzhov EU:C:2011:750 and C-249/11 Byankov EU:C:2012:608. 
obligation on a State to accept its own nationals,33 than it is for their family members and 
carers. As is well-known, the Court of Justice has recognised in the Surinder Singh case that 
family members of EU nationals returning to their home State after having exercised free 
movement rights in another Member State had a right of entry and residence in the home 
State at least equivalent to the right of entry and residence they would have in a host State.34 
While the Withdrawal Agreement is quite fastidious in attempting to identify and list in Article 
13 every possible configuration of residence rights for Union citizens and their family 
members in the host State arising out of either Treaty provisions or those of the Citizens’ 
Rights Directive and while it goes as far as codifying in the definition of family members in 
Article 9(a)(ii) the caselaw of the Court of Justice extending derived rights of residence to 
carers on which a Union citizen is dependent,35 there is no mention at all of any rights of 
residence of family members on returning to the home State.  
2. Exercise of an economic activity 
The Withdrawal Agreement contains two sets of provisions of direct relevance to the 
exercise of an economic activity by citizens: the first set concerns the package of rights 
attaching to the status of worker or self-employed person under Articles 45 and 49 TFEU 
and the second concerns the question of mutual recognition of professional qualifications. 
 Right to engage in an economic activity and ancillary rights 
Articles 24 and 25 of the Withdrawal Agreements transpose within the scope of the 
Agreement the rights for employed and self-employed persons contained in Articles 45 and 
49 TFEU36 as well as, with regards to workers, Regulation 492/2011.37 Article 22 of the 
Agreement also confirms the right of family members to take up an employed or self-
employed activity in accordance with Article 23 of the Citizens’ Rights Directive. Here too, 
however, these rights are expressly stated in the Agreement to be rights exercisable in the 
host State38 with no consideration being given to the exercise of economic activities in the 
home State. 
This could potentially open the door to discriminatory practices against EU27 or UK 
nationals, or their families, by their own Member State, either on returning to their home 
State or in the situation where they exercise economic activities concurrently in one or more 
EU27 Member States and in the UK. One could imagine, for instance, a situation similar to 
 
33 See case 41/74 Van Duyn EU:C:1974:133, para 22 or case C-434/09 McCarthy, para 29. Indeed, 
as the McCarthy case shows, EU law itself does not regulate the entry and residence of nationals in 
their home State and relies instead on national and international law. 
34 On the duty to facilitate the entry and residence in the home State of the unregistered partner of a 
returning national, see case C-89/17, Banger EU:C:2018:570. 
35 See, in particular, cases C-200/02 Zhu and Chen EU:C:2004:639; C-310/08 Ibrahim EU:C:2010:80 
and C-480/08 Teixeira EU:C:2010:83. The gist of that caselaw is that, where Union citizens have a 
right of residence in a host Member State but cannot exercise that right on their own on account on 
being dependent on someone else, the person on whom they are dependent should also be 
recognised as having a right of residence in the host State so as to allow the Union citizens to make 
effective use of their right. 
36 Article 25 of the Agreement also refers to Article 55 TFEU, which prohibits discrimination against 
nationals of other Member States with regard to participation in the capital of companies. 
37 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L141/1.  
38 Or the state of work for frontier workers. 
that arising in Scholz39 or Schöning-Kougebetopoulou,40 where the home State recognises 
previous periods of employment in its own public service but not in that of the host State to 
determine access to employment in the public service or remuneration. Similarly, EU27 
nationals residing in the UK, or vice-versa, but who also have economic activities in their 
home State could conceivably be subject to discriminatory taxation in that State. Yet, if the 
rights granted by Article 45 and  49 TFEU are, in the context of Articles 24 and 25 of the 
Withdrawal Agreement, only exercisable against the host State, those individuals may not be 
able to invoke the benefit of the substantial body of caselaw developed by the Court of 
Justice in Schumacker41 and subsequent cases regarding discriminatory direct taxation of 
individuals who derive some or all of their income in a Member State other than that in which 
they reside.42 
 Professional qualifications 
The Withdrawal Agreement adopts a rather minimalist approach to the mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications. It only provides for the continued recognition by the host State of 
qualifications that have already been recognised,43 or are in the process of being 
recognised,44 by the end of the transition period. Even where a qualification was obtained 
before the end of the transition period, the Agreement does not require recognition by the 
host State, let alone the home State, if the procedure for recognition was not at least started 
prior to the end of that period. 
In theory, individuals could thus find themselves trapped, from a professional point of view, 
in the host State, unable to return, or extend their activities, to their home State, to practice 
their profession without having to re-qualify there for the exercise of that profession. 
3. Social security and social assistance 
Social security and social assistance offer a contrasting picture. In relation to social 
assistance, we find once again the same pattern in the Withdrawal Agreement of entitlement 
in the host State but not in the home State that we identified above in relation to other rights. 
In relation to social security, however, the Withdrawal Agreement moves away from an 
approach in terms of rights to be exercised against the host State and opts instead for the 
application of the current social security coordination regime more or less in its entirety 
including in its implications with respect to obligations of the home State towards its own 
citizens and their families.  
 
39 Case C-419/92 Scholz EU:C:1994:62. 
40 Case C-15/96 Schöning-Kougebetopoulou EU:C:1998:3. 
41 Case C-279/93 Schumacker EU:C:1995:31. Schumacker concerned the free movement of workers 
but identical principles apply to freedom of establishment for self-employed individuals (see case C-
80/94 Wielockx EU:C:1995:271). 
42 See P J Wattel, O Marres and H Vermeulen (eds.), European tax law: Volume I, General topics and 
direct taxation, 7th ed. (student edition), (Wolters Kluwer, 2018) chapter 21, p. 445-465. 
43 See Article 27. The qualifications covered are those recognised under Directive 2005/36/EC on the 
recognition of professional qualifications, [2005] OJ L255/22; Directive 98/5/EC to facilitate practice of 
the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the 
qualification was obtained, [1998] OJ L77/36; Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual 
accounts and consolidated accounts [2006] OJ L157/87 and Council Directive 74/556/EEC laying 
down detailed provisions concerning transitional measures relating to activities, trade in and 
distribution of toxic products and activities entailing the professional use of such products including 
activities of intermediaries [1974] OJ L307/1. 
44 See Article 28. 
 Social Assistance 
Article 23 of the Agreement provides for equal treatment with nationals of the host State for 
UK nationals residing in an EU27 Member State on the basis of the Agreement and vice 
versa for EU27 nationals residing in the UK. This provision, which transposes Article 24 of 
the Citizens’ Rights Directive in the context of Agreement, enables individuals, including 
family members, who have a right of residence in the host State under the Agreement to 
claim social assistance on a par with the nationals of the host State.45 The derogations46 and 
limitations47 to equal treatment that currently exist under Article 24 of the Directive would 
also apply in the context of the Agreement.   
Under current EU law, citizens returning to their home State and their families would also in 
principle be entitled to equal access to social assistance and able to challenge measures 
and practices of their home State restricting access to social assistance in a manner which 
discriminates against those who exercised free movement rights in another Member State.48 
Again, this is not an issue that is addressed in the Withdrawal Agreement, which concerns 
itself exclusively with equal treatment in the host State and not the home State. 
 Social Security 
Title III on social security coordination in the Withdrawal Agreement stands apart from the 
rest of the provisions on citizens’ rights in at least two respects: firstly, unlike Title II, it does 
not express the rights that it confers in terms of rights to be exercised against the host State. 
Instead, it provides more or less for the wholesale application of EU rules relating to social 
security coordination49 to persons covered by the Title.50 Secondly, the scope of Title III is 
wider than the rest of the provisions on citizens’ rights.  Like the general rules in Article 10 of 
the Agreement, the rules on social security coordination are premised on the individual, 
being and continuing to be, in a cross-border situation between the UK and the EU27. 
However, whereas the cross-border element is defined in Article 10 on the basis of two 
variables (nationality and residence or work), the provisions on social security add a further 
variable, which is that of the applicable social security legislation. 
 
45 See, for instance case C-184/99 Grzelczyk EU:C:2001:458 or case C-456/02 Trojani 
EU:C:2004:488. Both cases were decided prior to the entry into force of the Citizens’ Rights Directive 
and on the basis of the general clause on non-discrimination on grounds of nationality in the Treaty 
(now Article  18 TFEU) but the outcome would have been the same under Article 24 of the Directive. 
46 Article 23(2) of the Agreement transposes the the derogations in Article 24(2) of the Directive 
concerning entitlement to social assistance in the first three months of residence (or the longer period 
resulting from Article 14(4) of the Directive) and to student grants or loans prior to acquisition of a right 
of permanent residence. 
47 In particular, economically inactive individuals whose right of residence derives from Article 7(1)(b) 
or (c) of the Citizens’ Rights Directive would remain in the same catch-22 situation under the 
Withdrawal Agreement as they would be under the Directive: claiming social assistance might ipso 
facto invalidate their right of residence in the host State (see cases C‑333/13 Dano EU:C:2014:2358 
and C-67/14 Alimanovic EU:C:2015:597). 
48 See, for instance, case C-224/98 D'Hoop EU:C:2002:432. 
49 In addition to Article 48 TFEU, the main instruments are Regulation 883/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, [2004] 
OJ L166/1 and its implementing regulation: Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems, [2009] OJ L284/1.  
50 See Article 31. 
Thus, EU27 nationals51 fall within the scope of the Title on social security coordination if they 
are subject to UK legislation at the end of the transition period.52 Alternatively, if they are 
subject to the social security legislation of an EU27 Member State at that point, they also fall 
within the scope of the Title if they either reside53 or work54 in an employed or self-employed 
capacity in the UK. The same applies mutatis mutandis to UK nationals who are, at the end 
of the transition period, subject to the legislation of an EU27 Member State or subject to UK 
legislation while residing or working in an EU27 Member State.55  
As regards continuity, the requirement in Article 30(2) of the Agreement is that a cross-
border element as defined above is maintained without interruption, although it does not 
have to be the same one as long as the individual continues to fall within one of the various 
situations envisaged in Article 30(1). For instance, EU27 nationals subject to UK legislation 
would still remain within the scope of the Title if they became subject to the legislation of an 
EU27 Member State instead of UK legislation but were nonetheless resident in the UK.56 
Even where someone does not fall, or no longer falls, any of the situations envisaged in 
Article 30(1), the Title will apply in relation to social security entitlements and obligations 
resulting from earlier periods of insurance, work or residence both before and after the end 
of the transition period.57 
Since the rules are not expressed in terms of rights against the host State as such, they will 
bind the home State just as much as the host State or, for that matter, any other EU27 
Member State. Thus, for instance, the UK would not be able to require social security 
contributions from a UK national working in a self-employed capacity in the UK and in an 
employed capacity in an EU27 Member State since Article 13(3) of Regulation 883/2004 
stipulates that an individual in this situation is subject only to the legislation of the State of 
employment. Similarly, an EU27 national retiring in his home Member State after having 
worked in the UK would remain, after the end of the transition period, entitled in her home 
Member State to medical treatment under that State’s social security scheme, in accordance 
with Article 24 of Regulation 883/2004. Remarkably, Article 32(d) of the Agreement even 
provides for the payment of family benefits to family members residing in another Member 
State even in the case of UK nationals residing in the UK and subject to UK legislation, who 
therefore do not in principle fall within the scope of the Title as defined in Article 31. This is 
notable as this has politically been a sensitive issue in the UK.58 
The approach in Title III on social security coordination is thus very different from that in Title 
I and II. This is welcome but we should probably see this as a reflection of the technical 
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58 See S Kennedy, ‘Child Benefit and Child Tax Credit for children resident in other EEA countries’, 
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complexity and difficulty in untangling rules in this field. The rules are designed to coordinate 
national social security systems. Their focus is therefore on interactions between those 
systems. An approach in the Withdrawal Agreement in terms of rights against the host State 
alone would not fit well in this regime and would add another layer of complexity in a 
coordination framework which is already anything but simple. The desire to avoid increasing 
the complexity of the system to the point of unmanageability may also explain why the UK 
accepted that social security coordination in the context of UK-EU27 relations should remain 
aligned, subject to limited exceptions,59 with the internal EU social security coordination 
system including any amendments occurring after the end of the transition period.60  
3. Judicial protection of acquired rights after Brexit 
If political institutions have largely failed to explicitly address the question of citizens’ rights 
against their own Member State after Brexit in the Withdrawal Agreement, could courts take 
over and the legal process provide the protection that the political process has been unable 
to offer? After all, the protection of citizens’ rights against their own Member State in Union 
law was also largely extrapolated by the Court of Justice out of norms that did not explicitly 
provide for such protection.  This could take the form of a constructive interpretation of the 
Withdrawal Agreement, Even in the absence of a withdrawal agreement, EU27 nationals 
residing or having resided in the UK could seek protection of their acquired rights through 
reliance on their status as Union citizens by extrapolation of the Lounes61 caselaw. The 
situation of UK nationals residing or having resided in an EU27 Member State may be 
somewhat less favourable. However, the possibility of invoking the Kurić62 caselaw of the 
European Court of Human Rights may provide some degree of protection of acquired rights. 
A. Constructive interpretation of a withdrawal agreement 
The absence of an explicit recognition of the rights of Union citizens against their own 
Member States in a withdrawal agreement does not mean that such rights could not be read 
into it. After all, those rights were first developed by the Court of Justice also in the context of 
an absence of explicit recognition of those rights in the EU Treaties. 
One could argue, in effect following the Surinder Singh logic, that recognising (implicit) rights 
to Union citizens who return to their home Member State after having residing in the United 
Kingdom before and after the end of the transition period is necessary to avoid them being 
deterred from exercising (explicit) rights in the Withdrawal Agreement to remain in the UK 
after the end of the transition period. For instance, EU27 nationals residing in the UK would 
currently have the right, on return to their home Member State, to be accompanied by their 
family members regardless of the nationality or nationalities of the latter. If they risked losing 
that right after Brexit, there would clearly be a disincentive for EU27 nationals to stay in the 
UK. Similarly, there would be a disincentive for an EU27 national to go to the UK to acquire a 
 
59 The exceptions concern changes to the scope of social security coordination as defined in Article 3 
of Regulation 883/2004 or changes to the exportability of cash benefits, in relation to which the UK-
EU27 Joint Committee set up under Article 164 of the Agreement will have to decide whether or not to 
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60 See Article 36(1) of the Agreement. 
61 Case C-165/16 Lounes EU:C:2017:862. 
62 ECtHR, Kurić and Others v Slovenia, Judgment of 26 June 2012, Application No 26828/06. 
professional qualification and/or to stay in the UK after Brexit if, in the case of return to their 
home Member State after Brexit, that professional qualification was not recognised in their 
home Member State. The same principles apply mutatis mutandis with respect to UK 
nationals returning from an EU27 Member State to the UK after Brexit with respect to the 
right of residence of their family members on return to in the UK or recognition in the UK of a 
qualification acquired in an EU27 Member State. 
Thus, even if the Withdrawal Agreement does not explicitly recognise citizens’ right against 
their own Member State on return to that Member State, such rights could be considered to 
be an implicit corollary of the rights contained in the Agreement. 
That the Court of Justice would take such a line cannot, however, be taken for granted. 
When it comes to interpreting international agreements to which the Union is a party, the 
Court has been particularly insistent that the context of the agreement, notably its objectives, 
its spirit and its ‘general scheme’ have to be taken into account.63 The fact that a particular 
approach to interpretation prevails in the context of the provisions on citizenship in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union does not ipso facto signify that a similar 
approach should be adopted when interpreting a different kind of instrument such as a 
withdrawal agreement.64 The fact that citizenship of the Union has been affirmed by the 
Court to be “destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States”65 may 
call for a particularly wide interpretation which may not necessarily be warranted when that 
status is, in effect, being withdrawn (in the case of UK nationals) or rendered inapplicable to 
the situation at stake (in the case of EU27 nationals). On the other hand, it could be argued 
that the purpose of the citizens’ rights provisions in the Withdrawal Agreement is precisely to 
neutralise as far as possible the effects of Brexit on the individuals concerned. From this 
perspective, an interpretation of the scope and extent of those provisions that would seek to 
mirror the scope and extent of citizens’ rights prior to Brexit as closely as possible, including 
towards their own Member State, may be particularly appropriate.66  
Even if the Court of Justice were to transpose the Surinder Singh logic to the Withdrawal  
Agreement, there is no guarantee that UK courts would necessarily do the same. There is no 
obligation in the Withdrawal Agreement on UK Courts to align themselves to the caselaw of 
the Court of Justice handed down after the end of the transition period.67 Nor is there a duty 
on them to refer questions of interpretation of the Agreement to the Court of Justice beyond 
the transition period.68  
B. UK nationals: the relevance of Article 8 ECHR and the Kurić caselaw 
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make preliminary references for eight years after the end of the transition period. 
Setting aside the provisions that could be contained in a withdrawal agreement, one of the 
effects of the UK leaving the European Union will be, of course, that Union law will cease to 
apply to the UK qua Union law. While much Union law would remain, at least provisionally, 
applicable in substance as ‘retained EU Law’ under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 
2018, its character as Union law would be lost through that patriation and it would, in effect, 
become UK domestic law. Deprived of any primacy over domestic law, retained EU law 
could not protect UK nationals from future interference by the UK legislator with their 
erstwhile Union citizens’ rights. 
With respect to residence rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular 
Article 8 on private and family life, may offer some solace. While the Convention does not 
per se guarantee a right of entry and residence in a State of which one is not a national and 
does recognise a general right of States to control the entry, residence and expulsion of 
aliens, it nonetheless places some limits to the circumstances in which a State may expel a 
non-national who has been lawfully resident on its territory. In particular, it is clear in the light 
of the Kurić69 case that, where individuals have spent enough time in a State to develop a 
“network of personal, social, cultural, linguistic and economic relations” that makes up the 
“private life of every human being”70 and may have formed family ties living there, it would 
constitute an interference with those individuals’ right to private and family life under Article 8 
for the State to expel them. It is difficult to see how the UK could avoid a breach of Article 8 if 
it were to expel at will a non-UK national who is clearly settled in the UK and has therefore 
established a private and family life there.71 
The Kurić caselaw is of significance mainly to EU27 nationals settled in the UK, or UK 
nationals settled in an EU27 Member State. Its relevance for UK nationals in the UK is not 
immediately obvious, as individuals already enjoy in international law a right of residence in 
the State of which they are nationals72 and therefore do not need to rely on Kurić to establish 
that right of residence. It would, however, be relevant for family members who do not have 
the nationality of the home State. In other words, it could be relevant for Zambrano carers of 
UK nationals and for non-British family members of returning UK nationals in a Surinder 
Singh situation. As long as the family is already settled in the UK before the end of the 
transition period, the non-British members of the family could rely on that caselaw to oppose 
an attempt by UK authorities to call into question their right of residence in the UK after the 
end of the transition period. 
Vidmar suggests that Kurić concerns primarily non-nationals who have established 
permanent residency in the host State.73 It is debatable whether the scope of Kurić is limited 
to permanent residents. The application of Article 8, however, would presuppose that the 
individual has already established a private and/or family life in the UK. If the family has only 
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recently moved to or formed in the UK, the application of Kurić seems doubtful as there 
would not be a sufficiently well-established private and family life in the UK to be protected 
under Article 8. 
Beyond Article 8 and the Kurić caselaw, it is not immediately clear that there is much in the 
ECHR to address the issues specifically raised by Brexit with respect to the preservation of 
Union citizens’ rights enjoyed by UK nationals and their families vis-à-vis the UK. To take the 
examples of taxation and mutual recognition mentioned above, neither the ECHR — or 
indeed any other norm — seems apt to protect a British national returning from an EU27 
Member State to the UK after Brexit from a refusal by UK authorities to recognise a 
professional qualification acquired in that EU27 Member State or to protect a British national 
residing in an EU27 Member State after Brexit from taxation rules that discriminate against 
non-UK residents even where such refusal of recognition or taxation rules would constitute a 
breach of Union citizens’ rights when exercised in the context of intra-EU cross-border 
movements.  
C. EU27 nationals: the persistence of Union citizen status and the Lounes caselaw 
EU27 nationals are in a different situation since they will remain Union citizens after Brexit 
and will therefore be in a position to invoke that status towards their own Member States. 
The difficulty for them, however, lies in the fact that the exercise of most Union citizenship 
rights is premised on having exercised right to free movement in the Union. If the UK is no 
longer a Member State of the Union, cross-border movement with the UK will no longer 
constitute the exercise of EU free movement rights. It seems clear, for instance, that an 
EU27 national moving to the UK after Brexit could not, on a future return to his or her 
Member State of origin, invoke the benefit of the Surinder Singh caselaw. Nor could such an 
individual challenge any discriminatory treatment by the home Member State on account of 
the individual residing or working in the UK rather than the Member State of origin or, more 
generally, the Union. Union law on free movement protects the free movement of persons 
between Member States within the European Union but does not protect the free movement 
of persons between the EU and third countries and the movement of a person from the 
EU27 to the UK would be a movement from the EU to a third country and therefore 
unprotected by EU free movement law.  
The same, however, may not be true of EU27 nationals who are residing or working in the 
UK at the time of Brexit or at the end of the transition period and continue to reside or work 
in the UK after that. Those individuals have exercised rights to free movement in the Union. 
The fact that the UK leaves the Union so that the place where they have exercised their free 
movement rights is no longer within the European Union does not change the fact that EU 
free movement rights were originally exercised. From this perspective, we are here in a 
Surinder Singh-type of situation: The right to return to the home State from the UK with one’s 
family is protected because it is the corollary of the original outbound right to free movement 
to the UK and it is that original outbound right to free movement which is, in effect, indirectly  
protected. If that is so, there does not seem to be any reason why the departure of the UK 
from the European Union should lead us to refrain from protecting that right as long as the 
outbound right was exercised at a time when the UK was still in the Union.  
We could draw an analogy here with the decision of the Court of Justice in Lounes.74 In that 
case, the Court found that the right of residence in the UK of a Spanish national who had 
also obtained British nationality by naturalisation after moving there had an unconditional 
right of residence by virtue of her British nationality rather than by virtue of Union law. 
Nonetheless, by moving to the UK as a Spanish national, she had exercised rights to free 
movement and came, as a result of that, within the ambit of Union free movement law. 
Those free movement rights include the right to lead a normal family life together with their 
family members in the host State, which could not be lost as a result of the later acquisition 
of British nationality by the individual concerned. As a result, Mrs Lounes’s third country 
national spouse enjoyed a right of residence in the UK for the purpose of allowing Mrs 
Lounes to enjoy her right to free movement and to the enjoyment of a normal family life in 
the host State by virtue of Article 21(1) TFEU. 
In the Lounes case, therefore, the change in the basis of her right of residence in the UK 
from EU Law to national and international law did not alter the fact that the original right to 
free movement was still protected even after the change of immigration status of Mrs 
Lounes. The fact that Mrs Lounes had exercised rights to free movement to enter and reside 
in the UK as a Spanish national was crucial, otherwise we would have been in an identical 
situation to that in McCarthy,75 in which the dual nationality of Mrs McCarthy as Irish and 
British citizen was not in itself enough to bring her within the ambit of Article 21 TFEU to 
generate a right of residence in the UK for her third country national spouse. What is being 
protected in Lounes therefore is the original exercise of the free movement right. 
In the same way as Mrs Lounes, following the acquisition of British nationality, was no longer 
exercising her EU law rights to free movement when residing in the UK, EU27 nationals 
would not, after the end of the transition period, be exercising their EU Law rights to free 
movement when residing in the UK. Yet, in the same way as Mrs Lounes original exercise of 
the right to free movement had to be protected by continuing that protection even after she 
ceased to exercise it by acquiring British nationality, the original right to free movement to 
the UK by EU27 nationals would need to be protected by continuing that protection even 
after they cease to exercise it following the departure of the UK from the European Union. 
Admittedly, the Court in Lounes noted that the acquisition of British nationality was in 
addition to Spanish nationality, leaving open the possibility that the outcome might not have 
been the same had Mrs Lounes lost her Spanish nationality on acquisition of her British one. 
Mrs Lounes was still a Spanish national residing in another Member State even though she 
was at the same time a British national residing in her home State. The analogy between 
Lounes and the post-Brexit situation breaks down here: one can be a dual Spanish and UK 
national but the UK cannot be in and out of the Union at the same time. That said, for the 
outcome in Lounes to depend on whether Mrs Lounes retained her Spanish nationality or not 
would seem difficult to justify. First, it would introduce arbitrary discriminations between EU 
nationals depending on whether their country of origin allows for dual nationality or not. 
Secondly, the rationale behind Lounes is “to ensure that the Union citizen can exercise his 
freedom of movement effectively.”76 Thus, whether the individual is still a national of the 
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Member State of origin should not be material for the application of the Lounes caselaw. 
Similarly, the fact that the UK is no longer part of the EU should not be determinant as long 
as the rights were originally exercised while the UK was in the Union. 
If this analysis is correct, it would mean, in particular that an EU27 national who has been 
continually residing in the UK before and after Brexit and then returns to their member State 
of origin should be in a position to invoke the benefit of the Surinder Singh caselaw and 
invoke a Union law-based right of residence for their spouse and children.77 Beyond 
migration rights and taking the examples of taxation and mutual recognition discussed in the 
preceding section concerning UK nationals, EU27 nationals having continually resided in the 
UK before and after Brexit could arguably, when later returning to their home Member State, 
insist on recognition by their home Member State of a qualification acquired in the UK. 
Similarly, EU27 nationals residing in the UK could object to taxation by their home Member 
State that would discriminate against them on the basis of their residence in the UK. 
Compared to UK nationals, EU27 nationals would therefore potentially be in a somewhat 
stronger position vis-à-vis their own Member State: transposition of the Lounes caselaw 
would enable them to future-proof the consequences after Brexit of having exercised free 
movement rights prior to Brexit, a result that cannot be achieved, or at least not to the same 
extent, under the Kurić caselaw, whose main focus is to protect a right of residence in the 
host state to individuals already settled there. 
All in all, there is therefore a strong case for considering that many of the rights enjoyed by 
Union citizens against their own Member State should continue to be at least partly 
protected after Brexit for individuals who have exercised free movement rights between the 
UK and the EU27 Member States at the time of Brexit or the end of the transition period and 
continue to exercise such rights afterwards. If the Withdrawal Agreement is ratified, this 
could be done by a constructive interpretation of the Agreement. In the absence of an 
Agreement, reliance on the Lounes case and the Surinder Singh caselaw on the EU27 side 
would allow a very similar outcome  to be reached. On the UK side, however, the protection 
provided by Article 8 of the ECHR would be limited to the recognition of some residence 
rights and the persistence of rights or advantages for UK nationals deriving from their former 
status as Union citizens more dependent on benign treatment under UK domestic law.  
4. The structure of the Article 50 process and the role of the institutions in it 
Article 50(2) contemplates the conclusion of an agreement between the Union and the 
leaving Member State setting out the arrangements for the withdrawal of that Member State. 
The expected coverage of the withdrawal agreement is thus left rather vague in Article 50(2). 
Those ‘arrangements’ could however prima facie reasonably include the consequences of 
withdrawal on the rights enjoyed by Union citizens — including those of the soon-to-leave 
Member State — and the Member State of which they are a national. Even though some 
aspects of the withdrawal procedure, notably the participation of the European Parliament, 
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could be seen as opening a window of opportunity for consideration of this issue, the 
centrality of negotiations to the withdrawal process constitutes a strong hindrance. 
A. EU withdrawal as a constitutionally-structured negotiation process 
The introduction of an explicit withdrawal clause in the Treaties following the Lisbon Treaty 
had two consequences which, while linked, nonetheless give rise to potential misalignments 
or tensions: first, it placed the withdrawal process resolutely in an EU constitutional 
framework rather than that of general international law. 78 Second, the choice of procedure 
for withdrawal made in Article 50 TEU puts negotiation between the EU institutions and the 
remaining Member States on the one hand and the leaving Member State on the other at the 
heart of that process.  
Those two consequences are linked, in that the very choice of a withdrawal procedure 
centred on negotiations with the departing State is not typical of international law practice 
which, as Hillion notes, is often limited to requiring a mere notification of the intention to 
withdraw.79 In that sense, the presence of a negotiated procedure could be seen as 
signalling a move away from standard international law. Yet, the very format of a negotiation 
between the departing Member State and the international organisation it is leaving adopts 
methods and tools which are those of international inter-governmental processes rather than 
those which are typical of domestic constitutional settlements. Indeed, Article 50(1) TFEU 
provides that the withdrawal agreement is negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) 
TFEU, viz. following the format for negotiations of international agreements between the 
Union and third countries or international organisations. Thus, the withdrawal process 
consists at heart of carrying out an international negotiation for the adoption of an 
international treaty albeit within an EU constitutional framework rather than the standard 
international law framework. 
The centrality of international negotiations gives the withdrawal process a strong adversarial 
character in which each side fights to protect the interests of its own camp and extract 
concessions from the other side. While considerations of the rights of individuals can figure 
prominently in such negotiations and this has indeed been the case in the Brexit process, 
the focus is nonetheless on one side protecting its citizens against unfavourable treatment 
by the other side. It does not lend itself to thorough examination of the problem that 
concerns us here, namely that of the unfavourable treatment by a Member State, or former 
Member State, of its own citizens. 
Eeckhout and Frantziou have argued that the fact that article 50 TEU is situated in a 
“quintessentially constitutional place” militates in favour of what they call a ‘constitutionalist 
reading’ of it.80  Among other consequences, such a reading, they contend, would demand 
that the withdrawal agreement should guarantee the protection of fundamental rights relating 
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to private and family life as a crucial condition of its constitutionality81 and possibly even 
contain measures to guard against regression in the level of protection of other acquired 
rights.82 If Eeckhout and Frantziou are right, this would potentially open the door for an 
argument that the constitutionalist reading they argue for could require the withdrawal Treaty 
to contain measures to protect Union citizens against loss of rights not just at the behest of 
the other side in the negotiations but also at the behest of the Member State of which they 
are a national. Protection of citizens’ rights would be the result not just of one side 
bargaining hard to protect its people from unwelcome treatment by the other side but the 
reflection of a constitutional imperative. As such, there is no reason a priori to exclude the 
possibility that those rights would include rights to be exercised against one’s own Member 
State. 
As Eeckhout and Frantziou themselves recognize, however, it would be difficult to conceive 
of a general legal obligation on the EU or the UK to protect all rights acquired as Union 
citizens where there can be no legitimate expectation that a Member State will always 
remain in the Union. Even in relation to the protection of the right to private and family life or, 
for that matter, other fundamental rights, it is difficult to see how there could be an obligation 
to ensure such fundamental rights protection in the withdrawal agreement when there is no 
obligation to conclude the agreement in the first place. If a ‘constitutionalist reading’ of Article 
50 TEU required rights to private and family life of Union citizens to be protected and that 
protection must be included in the withdrawal agreement to be ensured, it would seem to 
follow that there should be an obligation to conclude such an agreement as a condition of 
withdrawal. Yet we know that such obligation does not exist, since Article 50(3) TEU 
contemplates a withdrawal of the Member State even in the absence of such an agreement. 
This is not to say that no obligations to protect acquired rights exist. As was discussed 
above, there is a strong case for considering some obligations of this kind, derived from 
either international human rights law, or even EU law itself as far as the EU27 are 
concerned, do exist. Rather, the point is that those obligations are unrelated and owe 
nothing to the EU constitutional context of the withdrawal process and would arise in 
identical terms in a purely international law-driven withdrawal process. The existence of such 
obligations does not therefore detract from the point made here about the withdrawal 
process not being an environment conducive to bringing to the fore the issue of the impact of 
leaving the Union on the relationship between individuals and the State of which they are a 
national, whether on the side of the leaving Member State or the remaining ones. 
B. The role of institutional actors in the withdrawal process 
As noted above, the negotiation of the withdrawal agreement is the central piece of the 
withdrawal process and that negotiation is based on the format specified in Article 218 TFEU 
with one notable, difference, which is the role of the European Council. The wording of 
Article 50 TFEU suggests a role for the European Council limited to the issuance of initial 
negotiating guidelines and that of agreeing, if necessary an extension to the negotiation 
period in agreement with the withdrawing Member State. In the context of the Brexit 
negotiations, however, the European Council has had a far more involved role than the 
wording of Article 50 might suggest. Even before the Article 50 process was formally started 
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by the notification by the UK of its intention to withdraw from the Union, the Heads of State 
or Government of the 27 together with the Presidents of the European Council and of the 
Commission had already indicated at an informal meeting in December 2016 that the 
European Council would “remain permanently seized of the matter” and would update the 
guidelines “in the course of the negotiations as necessary.”83 This monitoring of the 
European Council throughout the process enabled to exercise considerable control over not 
just the substantive contents of the negotiations but also its sequencing.84 
Apart from the involvement of the European Council, the pattern followed for the Brexit 
negotiations was in line with the usual Article 218 TFEU framework with the Commission 
negotiating on the basis of a Council mandate and Council directives and the Council 
concluding the agreement. 
The European Council and the Council would be expected to approach the withdrawal from 
the perspective of its impact on national interests or on the interest of the EU as a whole 
albeit seen through the prism of national interests. From such a standpoint, for the Member 
States to decide to impose obligations on themselves collectively to protect their own 
citizens against actions that the Member States themselves might take following Brexit 
seems to run against the grain. Clearly, here too the focus will be on imposing obligations on 
the withdrawing Member State to protect the citizens of the remaining Member States and 
conversely accepting obligations towards the citizens of the withdrawing Member State in 
return. The Commission might have a slightly different perspective and may be somewhat 
more inclined a priori to consider the interests of Union citizens in a more holistic manner, 
including in terms of its implications in the relationship between Union citizens and their own 
Member State. Nonetheless, the dynamics of the negotiation, not to mention the negotiating 
mandate and the guidelines and directives from the European Council and Council are also 
going to lead to a focus, as far as citizens’ rights are concerned, on mutual obligations 
towards the citizens of the party on the other side of the negotiating table rather than 
obligations towards citizens on one’s own side. 
If there is one institution involved in the withdrawal process whose perspective is likely to be 
more centred on the rights of Union citizens qua citizens, it would have to be the European 
Parliament. According to the letter of Article 50, the involvement of the European Parliament 
is limited to giving (or withholding) its consent to the withdrawal agreement. One could 
perhaps argue that Article 218(10) TFEU, which gives the right to Parliament in the context 
of negotiations of international agreements to be “immediately and fully informed at all 
stages of the procedure” should apply by analogy.85 In any event, the power to give or 
withhold consent gives the European Parliament leverage to make its voice heard during the 
negotiation process. This was acknowledged in the statement by the Heads of State or 
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Government of the 27 at their December 2016 informal meeting, which anticipated that the 
Commission, as Union negotiator, would “keep the European Parliament closely and 
regularly informed throughout the negotiation” and that the President of the European 
Parliament would be invited to be heard at the beginning of European Council Brexit 
meetings.86 De facto, the European Parliament, in particular through its Brexit Steering 
Group, has been regularly consulted by the EU Chief Negotiator and has also issued a 
number of resolutions on the Brexit negotiations.87 
There is no doubt that citizens’ rights figure prominently in the positions expressed by the 
European Parliament. What is particularly interesting in that context is that the Parliament 
adopts a rather less partisan approach to the issue and shows concern about the rights of all 
Union citizens including UK nationals rather than just seeing its role as defending the rights 
of EU27 citizens. It is in this respect quite telling that the Parliament has repeatedly called for 
UK nationals falling within the scope of the Withdrawal Agreement to be recognised rights of 
residence and free movement after Brexit not just in the specific Member State in which they 
continue to reside after the end of the post-Brexit transition period but throughout the whole 
of the territory of the Union.88 There is, in this respect, a marked difference between the 
positions of the EU27 European Council and Council and of the Commission on the one 
hand and that of the European Parliament on the other: Whereas the former see themselves 
as essentially defending the interests of their side in the negotiations, the European 
Parliament adopts a more holistic approach to the interests of all citizens across the 
UK/EU27 divide, even where it means imposing additional obligations on the EU27 side 
rather than the UK side.  
Yet, there are no references to the impact Brexit might have on the rights enjoyed by citizens 
vis-à-vis their own Member State in the various resolutions adopted by the European 
Parliament and in the statements issued by its Brexit Steering Group. Admittedly, Parliament 
has on multiple occasions insisted that Brexit should not result in a deterioration of the 
position of Union citizens and that the Withdrawal Agreement should incorporate the full set 
of rights currently enjoyed by Union citizens.89 While Parliament draws the consequences of 
this in terms of commitments of the UK and of the EU27 towards each other’s citizens, it 
does not do so in terms of commitments of both sides towards their own citizens.  
5. Conclusion 
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The importance of safeguarding citizens’ rights was recognised by all parties involved in the 
Brexit process. Despite this, the Withdrawal Agreement leaves a number of gaps in the 
protection of those rights. A particular area of concern that this article has sought to address 
is that of the rights of citizens against the State of which they are nationals. As discussed 
above, the fact that continuous residence in the host State is required to remain under the 
protective umbrella of the Agreement means that individuals risk losing that protection when 
they return home , at the very time they are likely to need it most with respect to their own 
State. It also means that those who return early, before the end of the transition period, will 
find themselves entirely unprotected by the Agreement even with respect to the 
consequences of a situation that might have arisen during the exercise of their free 
movement rights in another Member State.90 Moreover, the way most citizens’ rights other 
than those deriving from social security coordination are defined in the Agreement as rights 
to be exercised “in the host State” would seem to preclude their invocation against the home 
State, leaving the door open to discriminatory practices in such fields as, for instance, 
taxation or social assistance against returnees or those whose economic activities span 
across the UK/EU27 divide, to non-recognition by the home State of qualifications obtained 
in another Member State or to restrictions or denials of residence rights or access to 
employment to family members. 
That said, the failure of the Withdrawal Agreement to actively and explicitly engage with the 
rights of citizens against their own State is not necessarily fatal to the protection of those 
rights. It would not be the first time in the history of European integration that courts step in 
to fill a void left by political processes. First and foremost, on the assumption that the current 
Withdrawal Agreement or a variation of it, is eventually ratified by both sides, Courts could 
take their cues from the Surinder Singh case itself to adopt a constructive interpretation of 
the provisions of the Agreement so as to ensure the full effectiveness of the rights that it 
contains and avoid any disincentive to the exercise of these rights. This would imply 
ensuring that individuals are no worse off returning to their home State after exercise of the 
right in the Agreement to stay in the host State than they would be not exercising that right 
and returning home prior to Brexit. It would also imply that an individual should not be 
discriminated if they exercise economic activities that span the EU27/UK divide after the end 
of the transition period. Thus, courts should be able to read into the agreement much of the 
protection currently provided by EU law in the relationship between EU nationals and their 
own Member State, thereby avoiding the negative consequences outlined in the previous 
paragraph. Even if the courts were to decline adopting such an interpretation of the 
Withdrawal Agreement, or if no withdrawal agreement were ratified, we saw that there would 
still be room to offer at least some protection of acquired rights in the UK based on Article 8 
ECHR for families in Zambrano or Surinder Singh types of situations as long as the family 
had lived long enough in the UK to be regarded as having a private and/or family life there. 
On the side of EU27 Member States, reliance on the Surinder Singh caselaw should still 
remain possible after Brexit even in the absence of a Withdrawal Agreement, especially in 
the light of the willingness of the Court of Justice in Lounes to continue protecting the 
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exercise of a right to free movement even where what constituted the exercise that right can 
no longer be regarded as such an exercise due to a change in legal status.91   
Even if there is therefore space for courts to compensate for or minimise the non-
engagement of the Withdrawal Agreement with the rights of citizens towards their own 
Member States, this lack of engagement remains nonetheless problematic. Eeckhout and 
Frantziou rightly urge us to adopt a constitutional reading of Article 50 TEU.92 Such a reading 
entails the protection of citizens’ rights. As they point out, a “meaningful constitutional 
interpretation of Article 50 indeed requires in-depth consideration of respect for individual 
rights as one of the most settled features of the EU constitutional order to date”.93 This 
includes avoiding a purely transactional approach to the withdrawal process and taking 
citizens’ rights seriously. Not treating citizens as “bargaining chips” is one aspect of that duty 
to take citizens’ rights seriously.94 Going beyond extracting concessions from the other side 
to protect one’s citizens and also asking oneself what one needs to do towards one’s own 
citizens to protect those rights threatened by the withdrawal process is also part of it. To that 
extent, the lack of engagement in the Brexit negotiations with the issue of the rights of Union 
citizens vis-à-vis their own Member State is at least a partial failure to adopt a constitutional 
reading of Article 50.  
As discussed in this paper, the adversarial structure of a process focused on negotiations 
between opposing parties has certainly contributed to this. This has to some extent been 
mitigated by the involvement of the European Parliament but these is something of a missed 
opportunity here for Parliament to assert itself more robustly as an impartial protector of the 
rights of all Union citizens by bringing in this additional dimension of the citizens’ rights 
debate in the Brexit negotiations. 
Other factors have also contributed to this blind spot. To some extent, a greater focus on the 
rights of citizens in the host State is right and proper. There are multiple examples in history 
to remind us of the havoc that sudden changes in the immigration status and treatment by 
the host State of individuals who have built their life in a particular State or region can create, 
as the Kurić case95 itself shows. The very way we have conceptualised Union citizenship has 
also played a part. As Azoulai puts it, “[a]s a Frenchman, I am ‘European’ by being given the 
opportunity to reside in Italy and to become ‘quasi-Italian’ with regard to the main aspects of 
my social life.”96 Such a conception of Union citizenship, focused on making me less of a 
foreigner in another Member State rather than on developing a common set of rights 
wherever I am in the Union including my own Member State, does little to focus the attention 
on the question of what it means to be a Union citizen in relationship between individuals 
and their own Member State. 
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That non-engagement of the Brexit process with this question is therefore understandable 
but a failure it remains. The blind spot in the Withdrawal Agreement over citizens’ rights 
towards their own State is unlikely to be attributable to a mere oversight and probably 
reflects a deliberate choice of the negotiators. From a UK perspective, one might be tempted 
to argue that applying its rules to its own citizens and their families is entirely consistent with 
the desire to ‘take back control’ over, inter alia, its own migration policies. It is worth noting in 
this respect that, while there are no explicit commitments or obligations in relation to 
Surinder Singh or Zambrano in the Withdrawal Agreement, the UK has voluntarily accepted 
that both Zambrano carers of a UK national and members of the family of a returning UK 
national in a Surinder Singh situation would be eligible for settlement in the UK under the EU 
Settlement Scheme.97 Not including this in the Withdrawal Agreement would therefore seem 
to be for the UK a question of principle rather than a substantive concern about the 
substance of the rights and obligations. The question, however, is whether this is an 
acceptable approach with respect to protection of citizens’ rights. If we regard this as a 
constitutional issue and adopt that constitutional reading of Article 50 TEU advocated by 
Eeckhout and Frantziou, it is not a question that we should leave to the goodwill of the UK or 
of EU27 Member States. Rather it is a question that we should not shy away from 




97 See Rules EU11 and EU12 of the Immigration Rules, Appendix EU 
(<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-rules/immigration-rules-appendix-eu >  accessed 14 
November 2019). 
